The Most Dangerous Game

One of my main objections to continuing military operations in Afghanistan is that there has been little, if any, planning on how to prevent the war from spilling into Pakistan. That the fragile Zadari government has been able to largely quell domestic dissent over U.S drone attacks is perhaps the most surprising development of the last two years.

Unfortunately, that isn't going to last forever. While the drone attacks have killed a good number of al-Qaeda and Taliban figures, they have done little to wind up the fighting in Afghanistan. Indeed, it seems as though the enemy's command and control has moved closer to Pakistan's major cities as the aerial bombardment of the tribal areas intensified.

If, in fact, the enemy is being controlled from Pakistan, and drone attacks aren't as effective as they should be, there is little option but to eventually move ground forces into that country. At that point, all bets are off. There is no way that the Islamabad government can be seen supporting that and the chances of major urban upheaval that could result in the overthrow of the Zadari regime are high. Worse, the odds of a replacement government that would continued to be allied with the United States and NATO are low.

More importantly, a NATO excursion into Pakistan would require the consent of the NATO membership, which is unlikely at best. In all likelihood, the pressure to obtain a UN Security Council resolution would be almost impossible to avoid, and China would almost certainly veto it.

So it appears that the Obama administration is doing the next worst thing.

The United States has renewed pressure on Pakistan to expand the areas where CIA drones can operate inside the country, reflecting concern that the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan is being undermined by insurgents' continued ability to take sanctuary across the border, U.S. and Pakistani officials said.

The U.S. appeal has focused on the area surrounding the Pakistani city of Quetta, where the Afghan Taliban leadership is thought to be based. But the request also seeks to expand the boundaries for drone strikes in the tribal areas, which have been targeted in 101 attacks this year, the officials said.

Pakistan has rejected the request, officials said. Instead, the country has agreed to more modest measures, including an expanded CIA presence in Quetta, where the agency and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate have established teams seeking to locate and capture senior members of the Taliban.

Quetta is a city of nearly a million people, and Islamabad is reacting to the request about as well as Washington would if a country asked if it could bomb the suburbs of, say, St. Louis. That would fly in the face of Pakistani public opinion and very probably expand the war in unpredictable ways.

The disagreement over the scope of the drone program underscores broader tensions between the United States and Pakistan, wary allies that are increasingly pointing fingers at one another over the rising levels of insurgent violence on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Senior Pakistani officials expressed resentment over what they described as misplaced U.S. pressure to do more, saying the United States has not controlled the Afghan side of the border, is preoccupied by arbitrary military deadlines and has little regard for Pakistan's internal security problems.

"You expect us to open the skies for anything that you can fly," said a high-ranking Pakistani intelligence official, who described the Quetta request as an affront to Pakistani sovereignty. "In which country can you do that?"

This is also true. Because of the impossibly low NATO troop levels in Afghanistan, there is almost no control over the insurgent elements, particularly in the border region. The drone attacks also tend to kill a dozen civilians for every enemy leader they take out. Expanding the attacks to more urban areas will drive up the ratio of civilian-enemy kills, creating an impossible political situation for Zadari. That's even more true when the violence on the Afghan side of the border continues unabated.

Pakistani history makes this worrisome. The country has had eight military coups in it's sixty years. Unlike India, which was built around the concept of political parties, Pakistan centers on a strong military that brings order when democracy goes off the rails. Those coups don't tend to be unwelcome by the people, although they have been known to overstay their welcome.

A coup by jihadi-sympathizing elements of the military or ISI would also heighten tensions with India, whom both the Bush and Obama administrations have been reaching out to. That outreach to New Delhi hasn't gone unnoticed by Pakistan's government or it's increasingly critical media. Part of the reason that the ISI supports the Taliban in the first place is because it fears growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and the potential for encirclement when the next war comes. In publicly tilting toward India, the United States is doing nothing to quell that impression in Pakistan.

In interviews in Islamabad, senior Pakistani officials voiced a mix of appreciation and apprehension over the U.S. role in the region.

The high-ranking Pakistani intelligence official said the CIA-ISI relationship is stronger than at any times since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and that the two spy services carry out joint operations "almost on a daily basis."

"I wish [our] countries understood each other the way the CIA and ISI understand each other," the official said. But he also traced Pakistan's most acute problems, including an epidemic of militant violence, to two decisions by the government to collaborate with the United States.

Using the ISI to funnel CIA money and arms to mujaheddin fighters in the 1980s helped oust the Soviets from Afghanistan, the official said, but also made Pakistan a breeding ground for militant groups.

Similarly, Pakistan's cooperation since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has been key to the capture of al-Qaeda operatives and the success of the drone campaign. But it has inflamed radical elements in the country and made Islamabad a target of terrorrist attacks.

"We'd not have been here if we had not supported the Afghan jihad, if we had not supported [the response to] 9/11," the official said, adding that it was "our fault. We should have stood up."

Remember, this isn't some "man on the street" interview, this is a senior intelligence official. Remember also that the Pakistani military and intelligence haven't been traditionally subservient to the civilian government. Rather, the civilian government has historically served at the pleasure of the military. That senior ISI people are speaking this openly to American reporters is a clear sign that Pakistan's cooperation might be coming to an end.

ISI has been playing both sides against the middle for years now. But it's becoming increasingly clear that they won't be able to do it much longer, not with the Americans wanting to bomb near major population centers.

There's a lot more at stake here than just the war in Afghanistan. A nuclear power in South Asia can go either way, which way it goes greatly impacts two other neighboring nuclear powers (China and India) and a potential third (Iran.) And Washington and NATO don't seem to have considered the many ways that things can go wrong, or planned for the possibility that they might.