Make no mistake about it, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities by Israel, the United States, or both, would be an act of war. And it’s about time that we start thinking about what that war would look like.
There’s something else that needs to be clarified; the difference between a pre-emptive war and a preventative war. As a matter of both international law and national honor, it is an important distinction. Too often, a possible attack on the Iranian facilities is described as pre-emptive, just as the 2003 war in Iraq was. Pre-emption requires an imminent threat – something so immediate that it cannot be ignored. This was the case when the Syrians and Egyptians massed their forces on their borders with Israel in June of 1967. Israel struck before it could be struck first, which is what constitutes a pre-emptive war. Interestingly, Menachem Begin, himself no flaming liberal, is said to have believed that even the Six Day War didn’t qualify as pre-emptive, although Begin is in the clear minority on this.
Barring an imminent threat, such wars are properly described as preventative. As I’ve discussed earlier, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq are all examples of preventative war.
Barring an imminent threat, such wars are properly described as preventative. As I’ve discussed earlier, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq are all examples of preventative war.
As this is being written, Iran has no imminent nuclear capability, as even the most hawkish of voices are prepared to concede. They seek war - without actually describing it as that - with the stated objective of preventing such a capability. By definition, this would make any such military action purely preventative in nature.
Let’s assume that – as currently seems likely – Israel unilaterally launches a preventative war against Iran. Given the hardening, redundancy and reported dispersal or Iran’s nuclear facilities, there is little chance that such an air strike would accomplish its objective. It’s entirely possible that Tehran has duplicated enough of its program in major population centers that Israel wouldn’t hit, or in hardened areas that it can’t hit, that an attack wouldn’t even significantly set back the program. We already know that Iran hasn’t made the same mistake that Iraq and Syria did, placing all of their eggs in one easily destroyed basket.
The Israeli air force would have to travel further without refuelling than it ever has before, hit more targets in a larger area than it has previously attempted, evade Iran’s formidable air defenses without losing too many of its pilots, and fly over several unfriendly countries just to get there and back.
Let’s further assume that Iran didn’t presume that strike had American authorization, which they almost certainly would. If Israeli fighter planes crossed the airspace of Jordan, Iraq or Saudi Arabia without defensive manoeuvres by those countries, or their warning Iran of those planes headed toward it, Tehran could properly assume that they were complicit.
That being the case, Iran could treat those nations, and especially the Saudis, as belligerents. The most obvious place for Tehran to launch a retaliatory strike would be the Saudi oilfields, which are well within the range of Iran’s conventional short-range missiles. While the United States might be able to reopen an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz in short order, they would be unable to rebuild the Saudi oilfields anytime soon. The destruction of those fields, combined with even a temporary closure of the Strait would cause the world price of oil to double or triple overnight, crippling he world economy.
The Shiite populations in Iraq, the UAE and eastern Saudi Arabia would also likely explode, further destabilizing all three countries and further driving up the world price of oil.
Iran would almost certainly retaliate against Israel with its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, who would rain missiles and motors down on Israeli population centers from Lebanon and Gaza. Israel would massively respond to both, causing mass civilian causalities, and losing whatever support Israel had left in Europe in the process.
Fearing domestic unrest, Turkey might break off diplomatic relations with Israel completely, and any chance of peace with Syria and Iraq would be gone forever. Indeed, “democratic Iraq” might actively start supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, giving both groups greater legitimacy than they enjoy today.
At this point, there would almost certainly multiple resolutions introduced before the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly condemning Israel, which the U.S would be hard-pressed to veto. China and Russia could use this as an excuse to not only violate the existing sanctions against Iran, but to publicly and massively resupply Bashar Assad’s forces in Syria.
The democracy movement in Iran would immediately evaporate, possibly for as long as a generation. The only thing that they hate more than the mullahs is foreign interference in their affairs, and the country – including the opposition - would rally around the government, just as it did after Saddam Hussein’s invasion. It’s much more than noteworthy that the Iranian opposition has never spoken out against the nuclear program. That seems to suggest that Iran’s strategic situation demands a nuclear capability, and that strategic situation would be highlighted by an Israeli strike.
This would be the result of an attack that didn’t end the Iranian nuclear program, or even set it back very far, if it all.
The above, again, is premised on the idea that Iran doesn’t blame the United States for the attack, which it most definitely would.
Hezbollah, which has long thought to have more deeply penetrated America than al-Qaeda ever had, could attack civilian targets deep in the homeland Mass shootings or bombings in shopping centers or mass transit in a dozen or so U.S cities – such as Israel has seen for decades – would result in economic and political anarchy in the United States.
The heavily rumoured relationship between Hezbollah and the Mexican drug cartels - which Fox News actually reports as fact - could become fully operational on the southern border, causing violent chaos in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and California. The Mexican government would almost certainly fall in such an eventuality, creating mass refugees and even more violence.
A total breakdown in homeland security, combined with skyrocketing oil prices, would cause the stock market to crash in ways that it hasn’t since September of 2008, when it lost half its value.
Unless he went to Congress for an declaration of war, Barack Obama would-be defeated for re-election by almost any Republican that isn’t Ron Paul. Either way, the United States would be committed to war.
The problem is that Iran is three times the size of Iraq or Afghanistan, the wars in which have demonstrably broken the American military. And even more than Iraq and Afghanistan, a war against Iran couldn’t be won solely by air power. Nor do I believe that you could dismantle the nuclear program from the air. There would have to be regime change, which necessarily requires boots on the ground.
Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran lacks a significant ethnic opposition to the regime that could be counted on to support the American invasion. The military resistance, and subsequent guerilla war, can be expected to be unlike anything American forces have seen since at least Vietnam.
After nearly a decade of almost constant deployments between Iraq and Afghanistan, you should expect large-scale desertion in the event of a war with Iran. Because of the sheer size of the country and its population, you couldn’t just rotate between the regular Army and the National Guard and Reserves. You would need a draft, particularly given how weakened the professional military is after the last decade of constant deployment. The United States would also need to devote significant military resources to homeland security, particularly along the southern border.
It’s also possible that under such circumstances, Iran would transfer chemical weapons to their terrorist allies for use against the U.S, Israel, or both.
The U.S isn’t like “Old Europe”, which used to name its wars after how many decades it took to fight them. After about 18 months of serious combat, American popular support declines precipitously, particularly when there’s no clear path to victory in sight. Since Iran is more militarily advanced – and would have a more unified popular opposition to invasion - than either Iraq or Afghanistan did, it stands to reason that such a war would last longer, and inflict even more in the way of causalities.
As we saw during the Vietnam era, there could be massive civil unrest and anti-war agitation. That could be worse, if combined with anti-government protests against security measures by the Tea Party right. If those people don`t want to get patted down before getting on an airplane, it`s reasonable to assume they`d like it even less just to get groceries.
War has a trajectory all its own. If, in 2001, you suggested that the United States would be in Afghanistan or Iraq a decade later, without actually winning, most people would have condemned you as a fool. Those folks don`t look so foolish now.
For the last thirty years, policymakers have been planning warfare based almost entirely on the best possible scenarios. It strikes me as well past time that we begin to consider how things can go terribly wrong, if only because over the last ten years, they have.
And you know what the worst case scenario is? That we spend all of that blood and treasure creating a fully democratic Iran that still decides it needs nuclear weapons, because the regional strategic calculus hasn`t changed at all.
Barring a really cool fight in the comments that I feel deserves its own post, this should be the end of my Iran series. I know that it was really long and didn't involve sweet, sweet pussy in any way. I appreciate your indulgence.
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